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CONTRACTOR DUTY TO THIRD PARTIES NOT IN
PRIVITY: A QUASI-TORT SOLUTION TO THE
VEXING PROBLEM OF VICTIMS OF NONFEASANCE
INTRODUCTION
On a hot summer night in July 1977, several million peo-
ple in New York City fell victim to a power failure due to the
gross negligence of Con Edison.1 That power failure lasted
twenty five hours.2 Among the victims was a seventy-seven
year old man named Julius Strauss, who was a tenant in a
building owned by Belle Realty.3 Con Edison was under con-
tract with Belle Realty to supply electricity to the building and
its common areas.4 Con Edison was also under contract with
Mr. Strauss, and millions of other New Yorkers, to provide
electricity to individual apartments and businesses.'
As is common, the water pump in Mr. Strauss's building
required electricity to operate.' The pump did not work during
the power failure, and on the second day of the blackout Mr.
Strauss ran out of water. After being told by a neighbor that
there was water in the basement, Mr. Strauss left his apart-
ment and headed down the stairs.' On his way down to the
basement Mr. Strauss fell down the darkened stairwell and
suffered serious injury.9
' Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 482 N.E.2d 34, 492 N.Y.S.2d 555
(1985). The Court of Appeals acknowledged in its 3-2 madority decision that Con
Edison was estopped from relitigating the issue of its gross negligence with regard
to this blackout, as that fact was clearly established in Food Pageant v. Consol.
Edison Co., 54 N.Y.2d 167, 429 N.E.2d 738, 445 N.Y.S.2d 60 (1981). See also infra
note 60 and accompanying text.




6 Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 98 A.D.2d 424, 430, 469 N.Y.S.2d 948, 952 (2d
Dep't 1983) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 424-25, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
8 Id. at 430, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 952 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
'Id.
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After filing suit against the real estate management com-
pany and Con Edison, Mr. Strauss moved for summary judg-
ment on the issue of liability to establish, inter alia, that Con
Edison owed him a duty of care. ° This motion was granted by
the trial court.1 The appellate division, however, reversed,
and dismissed the complaint against Con Edison, 12 concluding
that Mr. Strauss was not in privity of contract with Con Edi-
son when he was walking in the common area of the building,
and thus the defendant owed him no cognizable duty of care. 3
The appellate division cited H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co.'4 as authority for its position, ostensibly, that where there
is no privity there can be no duty. 5
Mr. Strauss appealed, and the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed the appellate division's holding, though for reasons
other than the lack of privity asserted and relied upon be-
low.'6 Judge (now Chief Judge) Kaye, writing for the majority
10 Mr. Strauss brought suit under both contract and negligence theories. Id. at
425, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
* Strauss, 98 A.D.2d at 426, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
Id. at 425, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 949.
13 Id. at 428, 469 N.Y.S.2d. at 948. The appellate division's opinion specifically
notes that Mr. Strauss's complaint failed to state a cause of action in either con-
tract or negligence. Id. at 426-28, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 949-52.
14 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928) (holding that a municipality itself owed
no duty to supply water to a fire hydrant for the use of a fire company, therefore
municipal contractor could not be held liable to plaintiff victim of fire for failure
to provide water to put out said fire). The Moch facts and reasoning flowing there-
from are not even remotely consonant with the facts of Strauss. See infra Part II.
A.
15 For the purposes of this Note, the terms "parties in privity" and "privity"
refer to the principal parties, parties that are intended beneficiaries of a contract,
or foreseeable plaintiffs in a negligence action against a contractor. As discussed
infra, generally, in New York, where an injured party is not in privity, is not a
foreseeable plaintiff, and an injury occurs as a result of nonfeasance,' no "legal
interest entitled to legal protection" against the contractor's conduct will be found
when the action sounds in contract. However, as the dissent at the appellate divi-
sion level in Strauss pointed out, theories of privity are outmoded in the negli-
gence context, and thus are improperly employed when attempting to define the
scope of duty for tort purposes. See Strauss, 98 A.D.2d at 433, 469 N.Y.S.2d at
954 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). See also infra notes 16 & 32 and accompanying text.
6 Privity has long been dispensed with as a requirement for recovery in an
action sounding in negligence. This fact was not lost on the majority, nor on the
dissent at the appellate division. As Judge Gibbons noted "there is no reason to
resort to theories of privity, [as they] are outmoded in the negligence context ...
. see White v. Guarente, 43 N.Y.2d 356, 361-62; Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330;
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382." Strauss, 98 A.D.2d at 433, 469
N.Y.S.2d at 954.
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in Strauss, specifically, and as I contend in this Note, correctly,
rejected the argument that duty in negligence cases is defined
by privity.17 Had she stopped there, no real jurisprudential
problem would have grown from this opinion. However, Judge
Kaye further reasoned that a finding of foreseeability does not
always require that liability in tort be imposed, adding that it
is the responsibility of courts "to limit the legal consequences
of wrongs to a controllable degree... and to protect against
crushing exposure to liability." ' In supporting this conclusion,
Judge Kaye stated that such limitations were compelled by
"public policy."
The reasoning in Strauss has become the rule in New
York, where, as I document in this Note, contractors routinely
escape liability for acts of negligence toward plaintiffs not in
privity, notwithstanding the fact that this requirement for
recovery in tort has long since been abandoned in New York.9
In fact, this Note demonstrates that New York courts are ex-
tremely confused in the area of tort liability of contractors,
often applying principles of contract law as a test for determin-
ing whether- or not liability in tort exists.
I propose herein that the proper analysis for determining
whether or not a contractor ought to be held liable in tort is
entirely separate from the question of whether a duty is owed
in contract to an injured party." The historical basis for not
17 Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 405-08, 482 N.E.2d 34, 38-40,
492 N.Y.S.2d 555, 559-61 (1985) (Meyer, J., dissenting). Interestingly, the Strauss
dissent at this level attacks the conclusion of the majority as being based on
"nothing more than assumption" and an unsupported prediction of disaster. Id. at
405-06, 482 N.E.2d at 38-39, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 559-60. Judge Meyer argued persua-
sively that the court overreached in its determination that public policy dictated
exculpating Con Edison from its responsibility to Mr. Strauss and others. Id. This
dissent has been largely ignored for thirteen years, and this Note argues along the
same lines as Judge Meyer, that, since most defendants in tort cases of this na-
ture that bring about the fear of ruinous losses are themselves public utilities,
public corporations, commercial enterprises, and other entities with the power to
spread the risk of the loss to the general public at large, the only party in litiga-
tion exposed to ruinous loss in litigation of this nature is the plaintiff
"Id. at 402, 482 N.E.2d at 36, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 557 (citations omitted).
See supra note 16.
There is no question that when a party assumes a duty by contract, and
then either performs negligently and causes injury or undertakes a task outside
the scope of its agreement and thereby causes injury, liability in contract exists as
between the contractor and foreseeable plaintiffs. However, when the same contrac-
tor fails to perform a duty contracted for, which nonperformance leads to injury of
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holding a contractor so liable is two-fold: (1) a suit for the
contractor's lack of action derives from an action of trespass on
the case in assumpsit, and there can be no liability as such
where there is no affirmative act;"' and (2) public policy dic-
tates that liability should be carefully circumscribed where
assigning liability raises the specter of "ruinous losses" for the
contractor-defendant.22 I further argue in this Note that the
first part of this historical "test" is flawed because it applies a
contract principle to claims sounding in tort, and the second
part, which may be called a cost-benefit analysis, should not
enter into a court's calculus of liability in this class of cases. 3
Such an analysis will inevitably lead to a conclusion that it is
too expensive to pay for injuries regardless of whether they are
caused by negligence or intent. Whether or not to bear the
burden of that expense is a decision for a contractor to make
during bidding, not for a court to make before allowing liti-
gation to proceed. Therefore, I propose in this Note that the
proper analysis is that of a "quasi-tort" test,24 which allows
for potential tortfeasors to better understand and take into
consideration before entering into a contract their potential
exposure for misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance. Such
an analysis also remedies the current problem that leaves
victims of nonfeasance without a viable remedy in tort or con-
tract.
In Part I of this Note I address the duty of contractors to
third parties not in privity of contract, giving a brief history of
the New York position.' I then introduce the common law
a third party not in privity or not foreseen, and the complaint sounds in tort, as
in the case of Mr. Strauss, the failure to perform often constitutes negligence and
that action in tort should be sustainable as between the injured non-contracting
party and the negligent contractor.
21 Jean Elting Rowe & Theodore Silver, The Jurisprudence of Action and Inac-
tion in the Law of Tort: Solving the Puzzle of Nonfeasance and Misfeasance from
the Fifteenth Through the Twentieth Centuries, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 807, 812 (1995)
[hereinafter Rowe & Silver].
2 See Strauss, 65 N.Y.2d at 405-08, 482 N.E.2d 38-40, 492 N.Y.S.2d 559-61.
See also supra note 17.
' As I demonstrate in this Note, where a contractor and a third party not in
privity are involved, and negligence is present, the court often confuses the issue
of liability with that of duty, short circuiting a competent analysis of liability by
declaring simply that no duty is owed to third parties not in privity.
24 See discussion infra in Conclusion, wherein this test is more fully elaborated.
The general guideline provided by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A
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conflict that has resulted from two recent New York Court of
Appeals cases, Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. YB.H. Realty
Corp. 26 and Palka v. Servicemaster Management Services Cor-
p 2' This discussion includes a consideration of the fundamen-
tal question of what constitutes duty under New York law. In
Part II of this Note, I consider what bearing misfeasance, mal-
feasance, and nonfeasance2s may have on questions of duty
provides in relevant part that a contractor who undertakes by that contract to
perform a particular service or task is liable to 'third persons" for negligent per-
formance of the task if the hirer had itself owed a duty of care to the injured
party. The Restatement guideline suggests, for instance, that a contractor engaged
by a building's owner or managing agent, to maintain the building's boiler in a
safe condition should not escape tort liability to the tenants of that building for
negligent performance of that duty simply because the tenants are not in privity
of contract with the contractor. Decisions like Strauss run counter to this common
sense approach, and argue persuasively that New York should, at the very least,
adopt the § 324A position.
26 76 N.Y.2d 220, 556 N.E.2d 1093, 557 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1990) (holding that there
is no liability when a company is hired to inspect and maintain a building and its
fixtures, and neglects to inspect a previously existing fire sprinkler system, which
neglect combines with the defective system to cause the plaintiff's property to be
damaged).
83 N.Y.2d 579, 634 N.E.2d 189, 611 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1994) (holding that a
duty was owed by a contractor retained by a hospital to train, manage, supervise
and direct all support service employees, to a nurse employee of that hospital who
was injured when a fan fell from its wall mooring while the nurse was tending to
a patient. The court distinguished its holding in Eaves Brooas, and seemed to fall
into the analytical trap of applying contract principles to tort duties, manipulating
logic to reach a just conclusion. See infra Part IfLB.
The existence of distinctions between misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfea-
sance reach back to the doctrine of assumpsit, wherein a defendants undertaking
or implied promise created a duty. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 92, at 658-63 (5th ed. 1993) [hereinafter
PROSSER]. Professor Prosser argued that liability arose from this undertaking or
implied promise, and that originally it was an action for trespass on the case, and
later one in tort. Prosser went on to say that the extent to which a contractor
owes a duty to a third person is entirely contractual, and that "such a claim
should not be translatable into a tort action in order to escape some roadblock to
recovery on a contract theory," e.g., lack of privity. PROSSER, § 92, at 659. Pro3ser
also points out that breaches may include failure to perform, and the recourse
there would be a suit for damages, or, in the extreme case even one for specific
performance. This, of course, is a remedy available only to parties in privity.
Prosser seems to argue in this section of his treatise that the contract itself is a
shield against liability for negligence. Prosser's reasoning does not allow for the
reasonable translation of the Basso abolition of classes of entrants upon lands to
abolition of classifications or degrees of stages of an undertaking, and suggests
plainly that recovery in contract should lie where there is misfeasance or malfea-
sance, but not where there is only inaction or nonfeasance. PROSSER, supra § 92,
at 661. As for tort liability, Prosser and supporting case law demonstrate that the
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and liability in New York, posing the question: Who is answer-
able to whom when nothing is done? I conclude that the dis-
tinctions between misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance,
while real, are moot for determining liability in this context.29
Part II continues with a closer look at Eaves Brooks, Palka,
and other recent New York case law in this area, considering
some of the factors used and considered by lower courts and
the Court of Appeals in deciding the question of scope of duty,
and thus, tort liability to third parties not in privity of con-
tract. Part III contains my analysis of the standard that
emerges as a result of the Palka decision, and explores policy
concerns that arise as a result of that and other recent deci-
sions.
Finally, I conclude that New York should abandon the
distinctions between misfeasance, malfeasance, and nonfea-
sance as a dispositive factor upon the question of duty owed,
much as it did away with the distinctions between trespassers,
invitees, and licensees for the purpose of determining scope of
duty for landowners,"0 as those distinctions are, for the pur-
circumscription of tort duty in this area is that of proximate cause. However, the
current state of law in New York does not allow for that question to be reached,
as a party not in privity will, as a result of the misapplication of contract princi-
ples to tort law combined with "public policy considerations" as defined by the
Court of Appeals in recent years, suffer summary judgment due to lack of being
owed a duty of reasonable care deriving from that lack of privity and the potential
cost of finding otherwise.
" For a more detailed explanation of this principle, see reference infra note 30
to Basso v. Miller, and its holding regarding the abolition of the distinctions be-
tween trespassers, invitees, and. licensees, for determining duty owed by a land-
owner to such people. The issue in Basso parallels part of the issue here, i.e., in
Basso it was determined that even a trespasser is owed a duty of reasonable care
under the circumstances, though the actual award of damages may be mitigated
by the trespasser's unlawful entry upon the land. Similarly, where a contractor
does nothing even though a contract duty is owed, i.e. engages in nonfeasance,
and thereby injures a party, liability should attach. The case law states otherwise,
as I demonstrate in this note, and as the Court of Appeals did away with the
landowner's duty distinctions in Basso, so too should it do away with the nonfea-
sance loophole for contractors.
"' Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976).
The Basso court overturned on appeal a finding for the defendant that was based
upon the plaintiffs status as a trespasser, as opposed to an invitee or licensee.
The unanimous court declared that:
[wihile we have demonstrated our inclination to correlate the duty of care
owed a plaintiff with the risk of harm reasonably to be perceived, regard-
less of status, and concurrently consider[ed] the question of foreseeability,
we have not, until today, abandoned the classifications entirely and an-
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pose of defining duty, archaic.3 I propose in this Note that
New York courts should seize upon the opportunity presented
by the Palka decision, and apply this standard consistently.
I. CONTRACTORS' DUTY TO THIRD PARTiEs NOT IN PRIviTY: A
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK POSITION
A. Background
In 1928 the New York Court of Appeals held in Palsgrafv.
Long Island R.R. Co. 2 that, absent a duty of care to an in-
jured person, a party could not be held liable in tort to that
nounced our adherence to the single standard of reasonable care under the
circumstances where by foreseeability shall be a measure of liability.
Id. at 241, 352 N.E.2d at 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 568 (emphasis added) (citation
omitted) (footnote omitted).
The Court of Appeals went on to criticize the lower court's charge to the jury,
which emphasized different standards of care owed to the three classes of entrants
on land. The court pointed out that New York was "not unmindful of the adoption
of the single standard of care in several of [its] sister state? with respect to tres-
passers, invitees, and licensees. Id. at 240, 352 N.E.2d at 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d at
567. The court determined that a landowner owed a duty to maintain its property
in a reasonably safe condition in view of all circumstances, including a consider-
ation of risk of injury, severity of injury, and the burden of avoiding the risk. Id.
at 241, 352 N.E.2d at 872, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 568. Most relevant to the argument at
hand is the Basso principle that the common law distinctions of degree of care
owed to different entrants on land ought to be abandoned. I argue in this Note,
similarly, that for the question of contractor liability in tort to third parties not in
privity, the common law distinctions between misfeasance, malfeasance, and non-
feasance ought to be abandoned in favor of one standard: reasonable care under
the circumstances. An essential argument in Basso is that it is foreseeable that a
trespasser might be injured, just as a licensee or an invites, therefore those classi-
fications are abolished for the purpose of determining the scope of duty owed to
entrants upon land. Id. This reasoning does away with the notion that a trespass-
er gets what a trespasser deserves, and no doubt forces a landowner to either
insure against damages for injuries to all entrants on such land, or bear the risk
of paying tort damages out of the landowners own pocket.
" See supra note 30 and accompanying text. See al-so Rowe & Silver, supra
note 21, at 829.
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) In Palsgraf, a person running to catch one
of defendant's trains, already moving from the station, was assisted by an employ-
ee of defendant, which assistance caused runner to drop package containing fire-
works. The fireworks exploded, causing a chain reaction overturning scales at the
other end of the platform, ultimately injuring the plaintiff, Mrs. Palbgraf, who was
struck by the weights from the scales. The court held that there was no liability
toward Mrs. Palsgraf, as negligence was a matter born in a relationship between
parties, and such a relationship can only be established if there is foreseeability.
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person."5 Palsgraf marked a fundamental shift from a consid-
eration of duty in light of unforeseeable consequences to a con-
sideration of duty in light of unforeseeable injury to a plain-
tiff. 4 The policy underlying such a shift seems obvious. That
is, there is a strong economic incentive in relieving potential
defendants of a common law duty to all persons and things
within or without defendant's contemplation of consequences.
Indeed, the argument continues, the line of duty must be
drawn somewhere, for without circumscription of duty, there
would be no limit to common law liability.
If that is to be the argument for the rule that no duty is
owed to an unforeseeable plaintiff, the next logical inquiry,
assuming we can agree on a definition of duty,35 is how to
determine whether a specific injury to a plaintiff is foreseeable.
New York's answer tends to equate "probability" with the con-
cept of "reasonable foreseeability," which is itself an amalgam-
ation of ideas advanced by Professor Prosser in his treatise on
33Id.
" For an interesting analysis of duty owed to those not in a particular zone of
danger, see Thomas T. Uhl, Bystander Emotional Distress: Missing An Opportunity
To Strengthen The Ties That Bind, 61 BROoK. L. REv. 1399 (1995). While Uhl has
a different take on the holding in Strauss, as well as some other cases discussed
in this Note, his analysis of the problems with foreseeability is cogent and serves
as good background material to be read in conjunction with tbh Note.
' The concept of "duty" is itself a difficult one to rpl down. For Professor
Prosser's take on the concept as "legal shorthand" for one's having a legal interest
entitled to legal protection, see supra note 28 and accompanying text. Another
commentator has defined duty in negligence law "in terms of a broad general duty
of reasonable care with exceptions, rather than as a series of specific duties which
vary according to the facts of the case." EDWARD J. KIONKA, TORTS IN A NUTSHELL
90 (2d ed. 1992) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding his error of defining a word
in terms of itself, to his credit Kionka acknowledges that "[cionfusion often results
from the loose use of the term 'duty' as a substitute for a proper analysis of some
other element of the negligence equation," though his illustration is deficient in ex-
plaining what those "other elements" are. Id. Additionally, while the New York
Court of Appeals has said that duty is "often" a question of law for the courts to
decide, see infra notes 52 & 53 and accompanying text, Kionka implies that it is
always a question of law for a court and never a question of fact for a jury. Id. at
91.
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Torts" and the common law from Palsgraf, Pulka v.
Edelman 7 and other cases in that line.' Not only is this a
leap of logic, it is a fatal one.
Another purported framework of analysis for determining
whether a duty is owed has more to do with how much owing
that duty will cost than whether a particular plaintiff is rea-
sonably foreseeable. From a classical law and economics per-
spective the answer to that question includes a consideration of
who can best bear the burden of the risk of negligence.3 Such
an analysis, however, also begs the essential question of fore-
seeability. Lastly, the New York Courts of Appeals continues to
apply an analysis that employs the age old distinctions be-
tween misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance0 as a
PROSSER, supra note 28, § 43, at 282.
40 N.Y.2d 781, 358 N.E.2d 1019, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393 (1976) (determining that
the Palsgraf principle that the risk to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed
"is applicable to determine the scope of duty only after it has been determined
that there is a duty").
' These cases include a district court opinion by Judge Learned Hand, The
Mars, 9 F.2d 183, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1914) (negligence case in Admiralty, wherein
Judge Hand opines that a determination of liability turns on the "reasonable and
proximate results of the wrongful act" of the defendant. This case is cited with
approval in Palka).
" This concept is related to Judge Hand's formula for determining whether an
actor's injury causing conduct was negligent. Hand opined that 'if the probability
be called P, the injury L; and the burden B; liability depends upon whether B is
less than L multiplied by P: ie., whether B<PL." United States v. Carroll Towing
Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947). Where the cost of taking adequate precau-
tions for preventing harm exceeds the potential economic loss multiplied by the
probability of an occurrence, it is fiscally imprudent to take such precautions. This
"cost" type of analysis does not apply, though, when speaking of contractor liability
in tort to third parties not in privity, as the threshold test for liability is, by
definition, not met. Holding contractors liable in tort for injuries to third parties
not in privity of contract may increase the cost of insurance for contractors. How-
ever, if one agrees with Judge (then Professor) Posner's analysis that "[wihen the
cost of accidents is less than the cost of prevention, a rational profit maximizing
enterprise will pay tort judgments to the accident victims rather than incur the
larger cost of avoiding liability," Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Neglignce, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29, 32 (1972), then rational contractors will factor the co3t of insur-
ance into their bids for jobs, and the problem will be solved one way or another.
Either the contractor will choose to take the risk of paying a judgment in favor of
a plaintiff not in privity who is injured by a contractor's negligence, or a contrac-
tor will insure against such risk.
, Misfeasance is commonly defined as the improper performance of an act that
one may lawfully do; malfeasance is defined as performing an act that one has no
legal right to perform; nonfeasance is defined as the non-performance of an act
that one is obliged to perform. BLAcMCS LAW DICTIONARY 1054 (6th ed. 1990), pos-
its that the distinction between these three concepts is "of great importance in
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threshold test of duty. Even though this is perhaps a proper
place to begin when liability in contract is at issue, it is inap-
posite when liability in tort is the question.41 If privity is out-
moded in the negligence context, then an alleged tortfeasor's
misfeasance, malfeasance and nonfeasance should also cease to
enter the court's consideration of duty owed, as those are con-
cepts found in a contract relationship rather than the re-
lationship that might give rise to a tort claim.42
In a related and unfortunate analysis, New York courts
often declare that even where a contract duty is owed to a
party, if it is not acted upon, no liability will be imposed as
between the contractor and an injured third party not in privi-
ty. As a result, New York has some interesting and conflicting
case law, as different interests are considered by the courts in
answering the question of to whom a duty is owed when a
contract exists, an injury is caused, the injured party is not in
privity with the tortfeasor, and the party owing the duty of
care to the injured party has taken no affirmative action.43
1. Contractor Duty in Contract to Third Parties Not in
Privity
The New York Court of Appeals has addressed the issue of
duty and liability many times since Palsgraf. In a 1990 deci-
sion, Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Realty Corp.,44 the
court unanimously held in a decision authored by then-Chief
Judge Wachtler that a company that installed sprinklers, and
the company under contract to inspect those sprinklers, owed
no duty of care to a building tenant building because the ten-
ant was not in privity of contract with either party.45 That
determining an agent's liability to third persons." For a comprehensive discussion
of the history of these distinctions, see PROSSER, supra note 28, § 92, at 658-63;
see also ROWE & SILVER, supra note 21.
,1 See supra note 28.
2 This is not to say that a court or a jury could not find a contractor liable in
tort. The point of making this distinction here is simply to acknowledge that the
duty analysis in contract and tort should begin with different questions regarding
the relationship of the parties involved.
' See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
" 76 N.Y.2d 220, 556 N.E.2d 1093, 557 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1990).
' In Eaves Brooks, a company that was hired to "service and maintain" build-
ing fixtures neglected to inspect a defective sprinkler system, which was a proxi-
[Vol. 63:5693
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holding explicates a root principle in the area of liability 6 as
it pertains to contractors: Lack of privity is dispositive when
the issue is one of liability in contract to third parties. This is
so because there is, by definition, no duty owed to a plaintiff
who is neither a party to a contract nor an intended third
party beneficiary who is a victim of a contractor's nonfeasance,
unless such a duty is specifically undertaken by a defendant.
The question for determining the scope of duty at this
point seems to be one of liability in contract, but it is actually
one of liability in tort. Ultimately, the question must be
phrased in terms of what standard of care a contractor owes to
parties with whom it may come into contact.47
The court's erroneous analysis was extended to the ques-
tion of liability in tort as well. Judge Wachtler, after all, fur-
ther reasoned in Eaves Brooks that imposing tort liability on
defendants for damages to third parties not in privity would, in
essence, force them "to insure against a risk the amount of
which they may not know and cannot control.... The result
would be higher insurance premiums passed along through
higher rates."' By including this tort liability dicta in its af-
firmance of the lower court's grant of summary judgment to
the defendants, the test in Eaves Brooks for imposing tort
liability, or for determining if a duty was owed, became a two
step test. The first step is a consideration of the privity ques-
tion.49 If privity is found, the second step is an inquiry into
whether misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance had oc-
mate cause of damage to plaintiff-tenant's inventory. Id. at 226, 556 N.E.2d at
1096, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 289.
"The liability spoken of here is liability in contract, though as noted through-
out this Note, New York courts generally, and erroneously, carry this principle
over to a tort claim analysis.
' The Court of Appeals drew a distinction in Eaves Brooks between standards
of care owed for personal injuries and standards of care owed for property damag-
es, but such a distinction is suspect. Id. at 227, 556 N.E.2d at 1096, 557 N.Y.S.2d
at 289.
" Eaves Brooks, 76 N.Y.2d at 227, 556 N.E.2d at 1096, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 289
(1990). Chief Judge Kaye concurred in this unanimous opinion, and that position
is characteristic of the tenor and concern of the Kaye court for containing and
restraining damage awards to plaintiffs.
" As noted in Eaves Brooks, the privity question is moot when the cause of
action sounds in negligence.
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curred." This seems indistinguishable from a contract duty
analysis, and as such, the test is inherently suspect.
While the Eaves Brooks holding seems to express a clear
position regarding contractor liability in tort to third parties
not in privity,5 it leaves a little room for discretion. Such dis-
cretion is apparent in a recent case where Judge Bellacosa of-
fered a different rationale for holding a contractor liable under
circumstances similar to Eaves Brooks. In the 1994 Court of
Appeals case Palka v. Servicemaster Management Services Cor-
poration,52 the court addressed the question of duty by rea-
soning that "unlike foreseeability and causation... [duty is]
usually a legal, policy-laden declaration reserved for Judges to
make prior to submitting anything to fact-finding or jury con-
sideration."53 While that statement appears facially sound,
those "policy-laden declarations" turn wholly on economic con-
siderations, often resulting in summary judgment in favor of
defendants.'
60 The mention of economic considerations at this point ought to be remem-
bered when reading Part III.B of this Note, as it plays an important role in the
calculus of the court's "policy-laden decisions."
1 That position was that a contractor would not stand liable in contract or
tort to a third party not in privity when the gravamen of a claim involved nonfea-
sance. It is easy to see how a court can arrive at this position, since the question
of duty in such a case is posed in the language of contract, and thus the question
dictates the answer.
52 83 N.Y.2d 579, 634 N.E.2d 189, 611 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1994). Servicemaster was
a contractor retained by Ellis Hospital to "train, manage, and direct" services in
the hospital. Servicemaster was paid in excess of ninety thousand dollars a month
for its services. Id. at 582, 634 N.E.2d at 191, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 819. The court
noted in its holding that "under the facts of this case" a contractor may be held
liable in tort (emphasis added). This limiting language appears as a matter of
course when the court does not want to upset precedent, and does not want its
holding to be applied too easily to similar cases. In essence, the court carved out
another exception to the duty/privity rule, and cautioned against trying to use its
ruling in favor of future plaintiffs not named Palka and not working at Ellis Hos-
pital who were not injured by wall fans falling from their mounts.
" Id. at 585, 634 N.E.2d at 192, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 820 (1994) (citing Eaves
Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Realty Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 220, 556 N.E.2d 1093, 557
N.Y.S.2d 286 (1990), which determined that, as a matter of law, "defendant nei-
ther owed a cognizable duty to plaintiff, nor assumed a duty to act in this in-
stance" (emphasis added)). Chief Judge Kaye joined in the 5-0 opinion of the court,
with Judges Titone and Levine taking no part.
14 New York common law claims to hold that most contractors owe a duty of
care to foreseeable third parties. However, even where an accident is foreseeable,
if the defendant could, in fact, have foreseen the accident but had no power to
control the conduct of the negligent actor, the defendant will not be held liable for
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Consider the following situation: A landowner hires a
contractor to perform a task, the contractor negligently fails to
do so or negligently fails to perform some aspect of that task,
and a tenant, guest, or passerby is injured as a result of that
negligence. Should the contractor be held liable in tort to such
third party?" Strauss and Eaves Brooks seem to answer "no,"
and Palka, "yes." This leaves the state of the law in this area
in serious disarray. Even before Palka, New York case law was
inconsistent as to whether or not contractors owed a duty of
care to all comers when undertaking a task and negligently
performing it (misfeasance), or when undertaking an action
beyond the scope of its contracted for duties and obligations
(malfeasance), thus causing harm to a third party. In fact,
where a contractor took no action, i.e., had "committed" nonfea-
sance,5 6 most commentators contend, and New York case law
supports, that no action in tort or contract would lie against
said contractor by an injured third party.
A typical contractual duty to perform a task brings with it
a duty to take reasonable care in the exercise of such perfor-
mance, though only to parties in privity and foreseeable third
parties.57 This reasoning creates an infinite regress, in which
the inquiry into foreseeability defines the duty owed, and vice-
versa.s However, certain contracts may be held to be void as
the consequences of that foreseeable accident Pulka v. Edelman, 40 N.Y.2d 781,
358 N.E.2d 1019, 390 N.Y.S.2d 393 (holding that a garage owner is not liable for
the consequences of a foreseeable accident where the owner had no ability to con-
trol the actor causing the accident). While the Pulka line of cases deals with par-
ties not in a contractor/contractee relationship, this concept has worked its way
into that line of cases, as well.
" This is essentially the fact pattern of Strauss, though with one not so slight
difference. The defendant in Strauss, Con Edison, was found to be "grossly negli-
gent" rather than merely "negligent." Strauss, 65 N.Y.2d at 405, 482 NXE.2d at 38,
492 N.Y.S.2d at 559.
" The oxymoronic nature of the phrase 'committing nonfeasance" is notewor-
thy, and adds to the argument for abandoning the distinctions between misfea-
sance, malfeasance, and nonfeasance, as currently used by the New York courts in
the complex equation for determining liability.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 73 (1981). While the duty referred
to by this section to a common law duty of care, the comments accompanying § 73
indicate that it is necessary to define the scope of the legal duty prior to attempt-
ing to apply the section's principles to a given case. This type of requirement
seems designed to limit liability and scope of duty to one of traditional reasonable
care.
58 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
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against public policy, undermining that basic principle of con-
tractor liability in contract.59
2. Contractor Liability In Tort: What Constitutes Duty?
Prosser observed in what is perhaps the most popular and
authoritative treatise on tort law that:
[tihe statement that there is or is not a duty begs the essential ques-
tion-whether the plaintiffs legal interests are entitled to legal
protection against the defendant's conduct. It is therefore not sur-
prising to find that the problem of duty is as broad as the whole law
of negligence, and that no universal test for it ever has been formu-
lated. It is a shorthand statement of a conclusion, rather than an aid
to analysis itself.-
Assuming this is true, any inquiry into whether a duty is owed
to a party must address the question of entitlement to protec-
tion against harm. This inquiry is a challenging one, and it
becomes even more so in the area of contractor liability in tort:
Is an unforeseen" injured third party entitled to legal protec-
tion against a contractor's "conduct" when that conduct is non-
feasance? This typical phrasing of the question further perpet-
uates the logical fallacy of the test for determining whether
liability might be imposed upon a party. "
" The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 178 (1981) offers a guideline for de-
termining when terms of a contract ought to be unenforceable as against public
policy. The section calls for a balancing of the interests between the public and
the parties to the contract, pointing out that sometimes "the contravention of pub-
lic policy is so grave, as when an agreement involves a serious crime or tort, that
unenforceability is plain." Id. § 178 cmt. b. However, the comment goes on,
"[elnforcement will be denied only if the factors that argue against enforcement
clearly outweigh the law's traditional interest in protecting the expectations of the
parties its abhorrence of any unjust enrichment, and any public interest in the
enforcement of the particular term." Id. According to the Restatement, the court
must consider the strength of the policy, the connection with the term, and certain
other factors, including "any interest that the public or third parties may have in
enforcement of the term in question. Such an interest may be particularly evident
where the policy involved is designed to protect third parties." Id. § 178, cmts. b,
c, d, and e.
o PROSSER, supra note 28, § 53, at 357-58.
61 Arguably, if one is injured due to a condition created or ignored by a con-
tractor with a duty to foreseeable plaintiffs, there is also negligence in the
contractor's failure to foresee the potential danger to that injured party.
2 See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text. See also infra note 70 and
accompanying text.
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The Second Restatement of Torts § 324A deals with tort
liability to third persons for the negligent performance of an
undertaking. Both the Second Restatement of Torts and the
Second Restatement of Contracts seem to be in agreement that
public policy favors voiding exculpatory clauses when a duty is
owed to a party to a contract or some foreseeable plaintiff, and
such duty is then negligently performed.' However, neither
the Second Restatement of Contracts nor New York common
law affords a contract remedy to third parties not in privity.
Furthermore, neither source suggests that a cause of action
exists where there is "mere inaction," i.e., "nonfeasance," to-
ward a third party.' Thus, it might seem reasonable to con-
clude at this point, as noted above," that whether a duty is
owed and the nature of that duty owed become the threshold
questions for determining if liability exists and thus a valid
cause of action exists." This, though, still ignores Professor
Prosser's caution about duty."
The common law of contracts in New York is consistent in
the area of contractor liability to third parties not in privity,
that is, none exists.' It remains, however, consistently at
odds with itself in the area of contractor liability in tort to
those same parties.69 In New York, a determination that neg-
6' Some exculpatory clauses have been made statutorily void. See, e.g., N.Y.
GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-322 (McKinney 1989), pertaining to caterers and catering
establishment; § 5-325, which pertains to garages and parldng lots; and § 5-326,
applying to pools, gymnasiums, places of public amusement or recreation. Sce also
U.C.C. § 7-202 (McKinney 1989), which applies to warehousemen; and § 7-309,
which deals with common carriers.
6 See Introduction, supra, and note 28 and accompanying text for the 'tradi-
tional rule" as construed in New York
See supra Part I.A.I.
As every law student is taught in a basic torts class, for tort liability to
exist there must be a duty owed, a duty breached, cause in fact, and the breach
of duty must be a proximate cause of damages. But this, too, ignores Proser's
admonition about duty and liability. See supra notes 28 and 60.
See supra notes 28 and 60 and accompanying text.
Professor David Siegel described privity colorfully, albeit in the context of
issue preclusion cases, as a 'loose-limbed ... doctrine that has wiggled in and out
of' case law in New York. DAVID B. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE § 461 (2d. ed.
1991). So, too, has the doctrine made its way in and out of negligence cases in-
volving contractors and their liability in tort to persons not party to a particular
contract.
' See, e.g., Johnson v. Robert Bruce McLane Associates, 201 A.D.2d 436, 608
N.Y.S.2d 165 (1st Dep't 1994) (security contractor); Koeppel v. City of New York,
200 A.D.2d 477, 606 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1st Dept 1994) (engineers hired to inspect
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ligence does or does not exist answers the question of whether
or not a duty has been breached. As noted above, this is logi-
cally implausible. According to the New York Court of Appeals,
this determination "is a matter of policy, rather than [one of]
foreseeability."70 While it is difficult to argue with the court's
logic when so stated, the court continues to employ an analysis
that considers foreseeability in determining scope of duty.
B. The "Traditional Rule" in New York, and its Exceptions
Under the traditional New York common law rule, where a
contractor was hired by a landowner to perform some task or
provide some service, and then negligently performed the task
or service, an answer to the question of whether the contractor
could be held liable to third persons for such negligence de-
pended on whether the wrong amounted to malfeasance, mis-
feasance or nonfeasance.7 This so-called "traditional rule" of
sidewalk); Raffa v. Louis Stilloe Roofing & Siding Inc., 182 A.D.2d 901, 581
N.Y.S.2d 888 (3d Dep't 1992) (contractor hired to repair roof); Bourk v. Nat'l
Cleaning, 174 A.D.2d 827, 570 N.Y.S.2d 755 (3d Dep't 1991) (snow removal ser-
vices); Francois v. City of New York, 161 A.D.2d 319, 555 N.Y.S.2d 86 (1st Dep't
1990) (Eaves rule extended to public contractor hired to repair roadway. Court
held, contrary to New York's customary public contract rule in which contractors
always owed affirmative duty of care to third persons, that the rule of Eaves ap-
plied in this context.).
70 Sukljian v. Charles Ross & Son Co., 69 N.Y.2d 89, 503 N.E.2d 1358, 511
N.Y.S.2d 821 (1986). See also D'Amico v. Christie, 71 N.Y.2d 76, 518 N.E.2d 896,
524 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1987) (holding that a determination that an event was foreseeable
does not mean that defendant had a duty to prevent it).
Prosser, in summarizing the general trend of liability in tort in the area
commonly known as vicarious liability, points out that the "general rule" has be-
come that an employer will be held liable for the negligence of an independent
contractor with a narrow exception in a limited group of cases. See generally
PROSSER, supra note 28 at ch. 12. These cases are limited to those in which an
employer is not in a position to select a responsible contractor or where the risk
of harm to others from the enterprise is considered slight. This, of course, is an
open-ended qualified approach to risk assessment, and while some would like to
make it a question of law, the phrasing of the assertion, and the common law
surrounding the question, indicate that it is one of fact for a jury to consider.
PROSSER, supra note 28, § 71, at 509. In other words, a duty of care toward a
stranger will pass through the employee to the employer. However, this general
rule is, in fact, not so clear once one attempts to determine if a particular claim
arises as a result of a contractor's misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance.
71 See infra discussion of Melodee Lane Lingerie Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co.,
18 N.Y.2d 41, 218 N.E.2d 544, 271 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1966), wherein it was held that
a contractor would be liable to third persons for misfeasance in the performance of
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Melodee Lane Lingerie Co. v. American District Telephone
Co.72 held that contractors generally would stand liable to
third persons for malfeasance and misfeasance. However, the
Melodee Lane rule employed a contract analysis to determine
tort liability, and thus dictated that contractors would not be
held liable for "mere" nonfeasance." Despite this rule, and
perhaps in recognition of its logical flaw, New York law carved
out numerous exceptions.
These exceptions may be characterized in at least four
different ways,74 and each of the four categories consists of
subsets with numerous potential fact specific variations. The
classical exception of no liability for "mere" nonfeasance, the
so-called "public contracts" exceptions, pertains to highway
its contractual duties and for malfeasance (though the court uses this term in its
discussion of contractual duties, malfeasance in fact occurs when a contractor neg-
ligently performs some sort of task outside the scope of the duties contracted for),
but not for "mere" nonfeasance.
18 N.Y.2d 47, 218 N.E.2d 544, 271 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1966).
As already noted, contractors could never be held liable in tort for negli-
gence under such an analysis.
14 Classically, there are only four such exceptions where a contractor would
stand liable even for nonfeasance. As set forth in Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N.Y. 233,
237-38, 120 N.E. 639, 640-41 (1918), these exceptions are as follows: (1) instances
in which there is a "pecuniary obligation running from the promisee to the bene-
ficiary," (2) "cases where the contract is made for the benefit of the wife," (3)
cases "where, at the request of a party to the contract, the promise runs directly
to the beneficiary," and (4) 'the public contract cases (citations omitted) where the
municipality seeks to protect its inhabitants by covenants for their benefit." Id.
But apart from these traditional exceptions, other eui generis exceptions gradually
became ingrained in the case law. One such exception involved elevator contrac-
tors, who have been held to owe a legal duty to tenants and invitees. Beinhocter
v. Barnes Dev. Corp., 296 N.Y. 925, 73 N.E.2d 41 (1947); Rogers v. Dorchester
Assocs., 32 N.Y.2d 553, 559, 300 N.E.2d 403, 4056, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22, 26 (1973);
Zannotta v. Haughton Elevator Co., 175 A.D.2d 449, 572 N.Y.S.2d 500, 501 (1991);
Weeden v. Armor Elevator Co., 97 A.D.2d 197, 468 N.Y.S.2d 870, 904-905 (2d
Dep't 1983); Spooner v. National Elevator Inspection Services, N.Y.L.J., June 7,
1994, at 22 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County) (though the distinctions between invitees,
licensees, and trespassers were abolished for the purpose of determining liability
in Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976)). An-
other exception involved auto repairs (Le., defendant A hires Service Station to fix
A's brakes. Service Station negligently fails to do so. A ends in collision with B,
and B sues Service Station). Sweusson v. New York, Albany Deps. Co., 309 N.Y.
497, 131 N.E.2d 902 (1956); Egan v. Bradley, 117 A.D.2d 777, 499 N.Y.S.2d 424
(2d Dep't 1986); Jackson v. Melvey, 56 A.D.2d 836, 392 N.Y.S.2d 490 (3rd Dep't
1977); Depelteau v. Ford Motor Co., 28 A.D.2d 178, 282 N.Y.S.2d 490 (3rd Dept
1967). These fact patterns, and some others, constituted instances in which a con-
tractual undertaking was deemed to give rise to an affirmative tort duty to "third
persons" not in privity.
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contractors and the like. The theory is that unlike the ordinary
contractor hired to paint a hallway, a contractor that under-
takes work in a public way such as a sidewalk or a street auto-
matically foresees that negligent performance, i.e., misfea-
sance, is likely to cause injury. Accordingly, such a public con-
tractor stands liable to third persons even for "mere" nonfea-
sance if it is foreseeable that not performing is likely to cause
injury. This "classical exception" seems entirely reasonable,
and if it is accepted then there is no good argument, other
than the potential cost of insuring against risk, not to make
this exception the rule. And that is no argument at all.75
This has been the "exception" to the "rule" for more than a
century, dating back to Little v. Banks." There, the defendant
contracted with the state to deliver public volumes of the law
reports and was deemed liable to third persons for its negli-
gent failure to do so. The New York Court of Appeals noted
that, while contractors were not generally liable for nonfea-
sance, the rule would be otherwise on the facts before it. The
court observed:
[c]ontractors with the State, who assume, for a consideration re-
ceived from the sovereign power, by covenant, express or implied, to
do certain things, are liable, in case of neglect to perform such cove-
nant, to a private action at the suit of the party injured by such
neglect, and such contract inures to the benefit of the individual
who is interested in its performance."
Due to this and other exceptions that have been carved out
of the rule, no true rule remains. Indeed, the rule now resem-
bles a Thanksgiving Day turkey that has been carved at for
two days after all the guests have left. We, while not left with
a bare carcass, are left with the dilemma of determining how
to assess contractor liability in tort to third parties not in priv-
ity. Before reaching that analysis, though, a brief consideration
of the history of the development of the concepts of misfea-
sance, malfeasance and nonfeasance in New York case law is
necessary.
" For two articulate expositions of why this is no rule at all, see Judge
Meyer's dissent in Strauss, 65 N.Y.2d at 406, 482 N.E.2d at 38, 492 N.Y.S.2d at
559, and Judge Gibbons's dissent in Strauss, 98 A.D.2d at 429, 469 N.Y.S.2d at
952.
70 85 N.Y. 258 (1881).
7 Id. at 263.
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H. DUTY AND LiaLmTY: THE CONFUSION IN CONTRACT AND
TORT LAW IN NEW YORK
A. Misfeasance, Malfeasance and Nonfeasance
The line between misfeasance and malfeasance has
blurred substantially over the years."' Additionally, nonfea-
sance has sometimes been characterized as rising to a level
consistent with misfeasance.79 As a consequence, the determi-
nation of when a contractor may be held liable in tort to third
parties not in privity has become unnecessarily more com-
plex.8" In the seventy years since H.R. Moch v. Rensselaer
Water Co., ' the rule has been' that a duty to the third party
general public will be imputed to a contractor in cases of mis-
feasance and malfeasance, but not for "mere" nonfeasance.'
As a result, the basis for establishing tort liability in New
York for ordinary contractors became logically and factually
independent of any obligation arising from an unfulfilled prom-
ise. It seems that there can be no doubt after reading Judge
Cardozo's opinion in Moch that he believed that in order for
tort liability to exist, an action of some sort would have to exist
as well.
78 See generally PROSSER, supra note 28, § 92, at 658-66.
"See, e.g., Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Realty Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 220,
556 N.E.2d 1093, 557 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1990), Melodee Lane Lingerie Co. v. American
Dist. Tel. Co., 18 N.Y.2d 57, 218 N.E.2d 661, 271 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966).
The general rule in New York surrounding the question of duty in the face
of nonfeasance may also claim roots in H.R. Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247
N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928). This is difficult to square with the courtes own
precedent set ten years earlier in the Ransom case.
8" In Moch, a contractor was held not to be liable to a third party not in privi-
ty when the third party's building burned to the ground as a result of the water
company's nonfeasance. Id.
' See H.R. Moch v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928)
(Municipality itself owed no duty to supply water, therefore municipal contractor
could not be held liable to plaintiff victim of fire for failure to provide water to
put out said fire.) The general rule derived from MAoch was eloquently explained
by Judge Cardozo: 'the hand once set to a task may not always be withdrawn
with impunity, though liability would fail if it had never been applied at all." Id.
at 167, 159 N.E. at 898. This is, no doubt, a very clear expression of where Judge
Cardozo thought to draw the duty line, as his use of the imperative indicates.
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1. Nonfeasance: Who is Answerable to Whom When
"Nothing" is Done?
Various attempts to solve this problem have emerged over
the past few years, but there is still no coherent statement of
New York law in this area. Generally, under current New York
common law, contractors stand liable in contract for conduct
that causes injury to foreseeable plaintiffs, including third
parties not in privity." This rule seems quite logical, having
been derived from the 1966 New York Court of Appeals case
Melodee Lane Lingerie Co. v. American District Telephone.
Co.," and left little doubt, until very recently, that a contrac-
tor would stand liable to third persons for misfeasance or mal-
feasance. It was equally clear that a contractor would not
stand liable for nonfeasance, or "mere inaction.""5 Indeed, for
liability to be assigned to a contractor where a third party not
in privity had been injured, conduct would have to occur, or, in
the convoluted reasoning of Melodee Lane, must not have oc-
curred, so that it rose to the level of some "affirmative" act
that might be deemed "defective maintenance."86 Such linguis-
tic manipulation designed to avoid liability creates a deplor-
able condition, is socially disruptive, and is just the type of
language Judge Wachtler cautioned against in his decision in
PalkaY7
Oddly, as noted in Part II of this Note, if one accepts the
Palka court's "policy-laden" calculus of how to discern whether
a duty is owed, and duty is a question of law with "mere" non-
feasance or the failure to perform a contracted for duty not
amounting to liability to third parties not in privity, then it
' See Melodee Lane Lingerie Co. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 18 N.Y.2d 57, 218
N.E.2d 661, 271 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966). This still begs the essential question of who
or what is a foreseeable plaintiff or injury. It also confuses tort liability analysis
with contract duty analysis.
8' 18 N.Y.2d 57, 218 N.E.2d 661, 271 N.Y.S.2d 937 (1966) (wherein a company
under contract to provide a fire alarm system was held liable to a tenant not a
party to the contract, for failure to report an alarm. The court held that the fail-
ure of the defendant rose to the level of "afirmative defective maintenance," rath-
er than mere inaction.)
" Id.
88 Id. at 65, 218 N.E.2d at 665, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 943. But see Strauss, 65
N.Y.2d at 401, 482 N.E.2d at 35, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 556.
See infra Part II.C.
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becomes altogether too easy to "discern away" duty.' Further-
more, foreseeability becomes logically moot in such an analysis.
B. The Eaves Brooks Decision, Nonfeasance and Scope of Duty
There has been confusion, as well as dissatisfaction with
respect to the general rule of nonliability in contract in the
area of nonfeasance. Case law demonstrates that the distinc-
tion between misfeasance and nonfeasance is often miscon-
strued or contrived,s" as is the distinction between misfea-
sance and malfeasance."
The Eaves Brooks court explained that its affrmance
rested "not on the distinction between misfeasance and nonfea-
sance relied upon by [the second department] to determine
whether a contractual duty could give rise to tort liability to a
third party, but rather on a weighing of the policy consider-
ations applicable generally to the question whether a tort duty
should be so extended." The Eaves Brooks court used those
' Even the court's Melodee Lane decision had to manipulate the concept of
duty to arrive at a proper decision by declaring inaction or nonfeasance to have
risen to a level of something called 'affirmative defective maintenance." See also
supra notes 83 and 84 and accompanying text.
' See supra discussion at Part H..
' See discussion supra. The question of contractor tort liability based on non-
feasance, though, seemed to have been settled by the New York Court of Appeals
in Moch, and reaffirmed many times over the years up to and including the deci-
sion in Eaves Brooks Costume Co. v. Y.B.H. Realty Corp., 76 N.Y.2d 220, 556
N.E.2d 1093, 557 N.Y.S.2d 286 (1990) (company hired to service and maintain
building and fixtures neglects to inspect fire sprinkler system, which defective
system causes plaintiff property damage).
In 1990, when the Court of Appeals decided Eaves Brooks, the New York
cases involving contractor liability to parties not in privity seemed to consistently
hold contractors liable in tort for malfeasance and misfeasance, but not for nonfea-
sance.Eaves Brooks did not expressly do away with the 'public contracts" excep-
tions to this rule, or other common law exceptions in New York, eg., elevator
contractors, but some lower courts read it that way. Additionally, Eaves Brooks
involved a claim for property damage rather than personal injury, and courts ap-
plied Eaves Brooks inconsistently where damages included personal injuries.
However, the New York Court in Eaves Brooks rejected its own long-standing
test for contractor liability, wherein the relevant question for determining liability
in contract was whether a contractor's inaction amounted to misfeasance rather
than nonfeasance.
9 Eaves Brooks, 76 N.Y.2d at 223, 556 N.E.2d at 1094, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 287.
This explanation seems to imply that there was, at the very least, a duty owed to
the third party by some entity. But the question remains, by whom. However,
perversely, the decision concluded that no duty was owed at all.
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"policy considerations" to engineer a holding which articulated
that the alleged nonfeasance of those defendants, when per-
forming their contractual obligations, did not breach any duty
of care owed to plaintiff. The court never directly addressed the
possibility that the inaction or nonfeasance in the case at bar
rose to the level of gross negligence.92 By not addressing that
issue, the question of whether misfeasance, malfeasance or
nonfeasance had occurred was rendered moot for the purpose
of assessing the defendant's liability in tort to a third party not
in privity of contract.
However, the Eaves Brooks court did note that "even inac-
tion may give rise to tort liability where no duty to act would
otherwise exist, if, for example, performance of contractual
obligations has induced detrimental reliance," and thus inac-
tion might rise to the level of "positively or actively... work-
ing an injury."3 The court quickly dismissed that possibility
from the case then at bar, though, indicating that strong policy
concerns dictated a preclusion of recovery upon the particular
facts of Eaves Brooks. It would not be a stretch to conclude
that these are the same concerns regarding limiting liability to
a "circumscribed class" of "foreseeable" plaintiffs expressed by
Judge Kaye in Strauss.94
Specifically, the Eaves Brooks court decided that it had a
responsibility to define the "orbit of duty, 'to limit the legal
consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree.' "9 While it
is not stated anywhere in the court's opinion, part of this limit
It is a well accepted principle in torts that even inaction may sometimes
rise to the level of gross negligence, and further, that such gross negligence may
sometimes rise to the level of "intentional" action.
' Eaves Brooks, 76 N.Y.2d at 226, 556 N.E.2d at 1096, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 289
(quoting H.R. Moch Co. u. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 167, 159 N.E. 896,
898 (1928)). This explanation resembles a quasi-contractual duty analysis, and it
seems to leave the door open for a "quasi-tort duty" based on individual findings
specific to facts of a certain case, as the court may find just. Compare Lawrence
v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
" Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 482 N.E.2d 34, 492 N.Y.S.2d 555
(1985). Chief Judge Kaye joined in the unanimous opinion of the court in Eaves
Brooks.
"' Eaves Brooks, 76 N.Y.2d at 226, 556 N.E.2d at 1096, 657 N.Y.S.2d at 289
(quoting its decision in Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 402, 482
N.E.2d 34, 36, 492 N.Y.S. 555, 557 (1985) (citation omitted)). The desire to "lim-
it . . . legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable degree" my reasonably be
read as a decision motivated purely by economic considerations.
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tended to be read as one dealing with injury to property rather
than personal injury." Indeed, some of the cases decided be-
tween and after Eaves Brooks and Palka, drew a clear and
clean distinction between personal injury and property dam-
age.
97
While this seems to be a logical distinction, it is one with-
out relevance. Curiously, less than one month before its opin-
ion in Eaves Brooks, the Court of Appeals stated in Hall v.
United Parcel Services of America, Inc.,"s that "if plaintiff had
sustained physical injury... rather than the less tangible
reputational injury he sustained, there would be no question of
his right to maintain a cause of action against the examiner,
notwithstanding the absence of a relationship of privity.' At
that point in time the court seemed to be confused about how
to determine whether liability would exist; while Eaves Brooks
weighed public policy to determine if liability in tort existed, it
still applied a contract liability analysis that spoke of privity
and nonfeasance.
C. The Palka Decision and its Reading of Scope of Duty
While Eaves Brooks was being applied by New York's
lower courts idiosyncratically where there was a question of
tort liability of contractors to third parties not in privity,"
Palka v. Servicemaster Management Services Corporation...
was making its way through the system. It was in Palka that
11 See, e.g., Tate v. Clancy-Cullen Storage Co., Inc., 178 A.D.2d 292, 577
N.Y.S.2d 377 (1st Dep't 1991) (holding that a liability limitation clause in a con-
tract applied only to furnishing of alarm systems and not to personal injury).
7Id.
98 76 N.Y.2d 27, 555 N.E.2d 273, 556 N.Y.S.2d 21, (1990) (wherein lower
courts dismissal of plaintiffs actions for defamation, intentional infliction of Ise-
vere] emotional distress and negligent administration of an examination was sus-
tained).
9Id.
19 See, e.g., Flynn v. Niagara University, 198 A.D.2d 262, 603 N.Y.S.2d 874 (2d
Dep't 1993) (liability may obtain in action brought against security company by
third party not in privity when security guards took affirmative action to stop
snowball fight); Guarcello v. Rouse Si Shopping Center, Inc., 204 A.D.2d 685, 612
N.Y.S.2d 239 (2d Dep't 1994) (holding no liability for tenant or landlord to third
party patron where tenant did not explicitly assume any duty to prevent foresee-
able harm to patron, who was assaulted by other youths directly outside tenant's
premises).
101 83 N.Y.2d 579, 634 N.E.2d 189, 611 N.Y.S.2d 817 (1994).
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the Court of Appeals announced that it never intended Eaves
Brooks to apply to personal injury actions. The court wrote
that Eaves Brooks had involved property damage, and that, as
a result, the holding "did not automatically carry over to per-
sonal injury claims where other public policies, factors and
analytical considerations are in play."' In addition, the
court stated that the question of whether liability could be
imposed for "mere" inaction on the part of a contractor would
have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis."0 ' Thus, Palka
presented a prime opjiortunity for the court to define a rule,
rather than to continue to carve out exceptions to the existing
rule.
In Palka, a nurse working at Ellis Hospital was helping a
patient when a wall fan fell from its mooring, injuring the
nurse. She sued Servicemaster for its "negligent or failed per-
formance of the contractual obligations to Ellis Hospital."0 4
Two years prior to the accident, Ellis Hospital had contracted
out its management services to Servicemaster. The scope of the
contract included a duty to "train, manage, and direct" servic-
es, specifically including the hospital's maintenance depart-
ment.105
In an interesting twist of logic, the court managed to dis-
tinguish its own controlling precedent and find in favor of the
plaintiff on tort theory rather than contract theory. Judge
Bellacosa, writing for a unanimous court, explained that "pre-
cedents and principles point the way to [a] determination of
whether Servicemaster's duty extends to plaintiff."0 6 Addi-
tionally, it was adduced at trial that: (1) Servicemaster denied
maintenance of the fan was within the scope of its contract; (2)
102 Id. at 587, 634 N.E.2d at 194, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 822.
103 Id.
1- Id. at 582, 634 N.E.2d at 191, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 818.
105 Id.
10- Palka, 83 N.Y.2d at 587, 634 N.E.2d at 193, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 821. This is,
once again, an analysis that seems to begin with an inquiry into the duty of a
contractor to a third party not in privity, and proceeds to lump together "negligent
or failed performance"--misfeasance and nonfeasance-to arrive at an answer to
the question of liability in tort. The court's reasoning in Polka as a whole is mud-
dy. The opinion discusses tort and contract duties at, length, and rather than de-
ciding if Servicemaster's liability was in contract or tort, it cited Strauss for the
proposition that "the nexus for a tort relationship between the defendant's contrac-
tual obligation and the injured noncontracting plaintiffs reliance and injury must
be direct and demonstrable, not incidental or merely collateral." Id.
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it never undertook to repair or maintain the fan that fell; and,
(3) there was no contract provision requiring a "general inspec-
tion program" including the fan in issue or any other fan in the
hospital.' Following the precedent of the court to that date,
it would appear that since the plaintiff was not in privity with
the contractor and the contractor had no duty to the hospital to
maintain the fan, and because the plaintiff was not injured as
a result of any affirmative act of defendant, no liability should
attach. There was also an indemnification clause in the con-
tract between Servicemaster and the hospital, holding Ellis
harmless for any acts or omissions of 'Servicemaster. Thus,
plaintiff could have been left without any remedy beyond
worker's compensation.
Palka seems like the classic fact pattern crying out for the
application of the rule of Eaves Brooks, Moch, Strauss line of
cases holding that contractors are not liable to third parties
not in privity, especially for "mere nonfeasance."' Indeed,
the Palka court acknowledged that "Servicemaster's resppzisi-
bility to Ellis Hospital to inspect and repair... does not auto-
matically make it liable in tort for this noncontracting
plaintiffs injuries." 9
The court began its analysis with the proposition that
before liability may attach, a duty must be owed. This, of
course, ignores Professor Prosser's admonition that an inquiry
into duty at this point begs the question of whether or not the
plaintiff possesses a legal interest that is entitled to legal pro-
tection. Fortunately for Palka, the court found its way through
the mine field of precedent and arrived at the conclusion that
she was, indeed, entitled to legal protection."' The court rea-
107 Id. at 584, 634 N.E.2d at 191, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
loS See Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 169 N.E. 896 (1928).
See also Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 482 N.E.2d 34, 492 N.Y.S.2d
555 (1985).
," Polka, 83 N.Y.2d at 584, 634 N.E.2d at 192, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
* The court first pronounced that Servicemaster "assumed a duty to act," and
this gave Nurse Palka a legal interest that entitled her. t6 'kigprotection. Id. at
583, 634 N.E.2d at 191, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 819. It then hfieithat Nurse Palka
proved that Servicemasters duty extended to her because slie proved not only
that Servicemaster undertook to provide a service to Ellis Hospital and did so
negligently, but also that its conduct.., placed Nurse Pallra in an unreasonably
risky setting greater than that, had Servicemaster never ventured into its ho3pital
servicing role at all." Id. at 587. Curiously though, plaintiff's injuries were the
result of the contractor's failure to act at all. The court's analysis seems to indi-
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soned quite cogently that duty is "not something derived or
discerned from an algebraic formula. Rather it coalesces from
vectored forces including logic, science, weighty competing
socioeconomic policies," and other factors including assumption
of responsibility and an injured person's reasonable expectation
of the care owed."'
In short, the Palka court found a way to reach a just deci-
sion. Why the court could not do so in the case of Mr. Strauss
remains unclear when looking at the positions of the parties
involved. In holding Servicemaster liable in Palka, the court
both cites with approval and distinguishes Strauss, Moch,
Eaves Brooks, and similar cases with slight of the judicial
hand. In what sounds like a finding of liability in tort rather
than contract, the court writes that here "the functions to be
performed by Servicemaster were not directed to a faceless or
unlimited universe of persons. Rather [they were directed
toward] a known and identifiable group... ." This moves the
court into the territory it proclaimed it wanted to avoid in
Strauss, for Palka, if properly applied, opens the door that
Judge Kaye was so concerned with keeping closed in
Strauss."
III. POLICY WITHOUT A COMPASS
A. Palka as the New Standard for Determining Liability in
Tort to Third Parties Not in Privity
It seems obvious that injustice may arise when no liability
attaches for a contractor's nonfeasance that injures a third
party not in privity."' Before the court's pronouncement in
cate that this failure to act rises to the level of "affirmative defective mainte-
nance." Ultimately this holding has elements of quasi-contract, contract, and tort
liability, and it is unclear on what theory the court really bases its decision.
... Id. at 585, 634 N.E.2d at 192, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 820.
"12 Chief Judge Kaye concurred with the opinion of the court in Palka. It seems
that the Palka court adopted sub silentio, if not downright furtively, the position
of Judge Meyer's dissent in Strauss. This lack of acknowledgment of the Strauss
dissent might have been executed with deference to Chief Judge Kaye, who
authored the Strauss majority decision.
11" In addition to the cases already cited, see e.g., Strauss v. Belle Realty Co.,
65 N.Y.2d 399, 482 N.E.2d 34, 492 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1985), there are many more
clear examples of the type of injustice that can occur when no liability attaches to
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Palka that the defendant impliedly promised to maintain the
fan that injured Nurse Palka and then failed to do so, failure
to act on a promise did not, in and of itself, create tort liabili-
ty.n4 Indeed, as noted above, the rule before Palka seemed to
be that when a contractor simply did nothing, and that inac-
tion resulted in real injuries to a party not in privity, that
party would be unable to recover damages in contract or tort.
The injured party was deemed not to be owed a duty of care by
the actual tortfeasor, even though the tortfeasor owed a con-
tractual duty of care to the principal, and the principal owed a
common law duty to the injured third party.
B. Beyond Palka" Trepidation in Approaching the Slippery
Slope
On the one hand, past Court of Appeals decisions state
that public contractors owe an affirmative duty to the public
even though ordinary contractors do not, and such view is
wholly consistent with the recent, "policy-laden" decision mak-
ing process of Palka. On the other hand, the lower courts in
New York, without citing or distinguishing the old line of pub-
nonfeasance. See, e.g., McGowan v. J.H. Winchester & Co., 78 F. Supp. 507
(S.D.N.Y. 1948). This 1948 shipping case involved the injury of a third party due
to the negligence of a crew member. Applying New York law, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York quoted the New York Court
of Appeals case Caldarola v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 295 N.Y. 463, 68 NXE.2d
444, 61 N.Y.S.2d 164 (1946), for the proposition that defendant agents are answer-
able in negligence to principal employers, but not to third parties where nonfea-
sance has caused injury.
In Caldarola the court found that no duty was owed to plaintiff by the
tortfeasor since the plaintiff and the tortfeasor were not in privity. Specifically, a
longshoreman plaintiff injured by a boom that a jury found to be defective con-
tended that even though defendants were not in control of the ship at the time
plaintiff was injured, the duty to maintain the ship and keep it in good repair
that was owed by the operator of the ship to the defendant/owner shipping line
extended to plaintiff, The court inferred that the key question in determining
liability was control of the ship, and as the defendants had assigned control to an
operator, in this case the United States, this was a case of nonfeasance and thus
no liability as between the injured third party and the operator obtained due to
lack of privity. No privity, no affirmative act, no duty, no recovery. When a con-
tractor is guilty of nonfeasance, New York common law today resembles
Caldarola's agency treatment of tort liability.
.. As Professor Prosser points out, "[tihere is no tort liability for nonfeasance,
i.e., for failing to do what one has promised to do in the absence of a duty to act
apart from the promise made." PROSSER, supra note 28, § 92, at 657.
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lie contractor cases, repeatedly assert that no affirmative duty
is owed. In so holding, these courts have ironically held-public
contractors to a lesser standard than would apply under Palka.
This is not the only problem that has resulted from the
lower courts in New York reading the Palka standard differ-
ently, or ignoring it entirely, in recent years. Ellis v. Peter,n5
for instance, is a case in which the appellate division ignored
the direction of Palka, dismissing a cause of action brought by
a wife who contracted tuberculosis from her husband while he
was under defendant's care. The wife alleged that the physi-
cian breached a statutory duty to warn those living with a
tuberculosis patient of the danger of coming down with the
disease."6 The court's rationale seemed to be focused on hold-
ing down costs by limiting the scope of potential plaintiffs in
cases of this nature.1
7
While the appellate court expressed a common fear, its
conclusion is simply wrong.' The only rationale offered for
its decision is that allowing for liability in this case might open
the proverbial floodgates of litigation."' While the plaintiff in
Ellis may have had an action in negligence if she could prove
that the failure to warn was a proximate cause of her inju-
ry-and clearly it was-her action would have failed because
n' 211 A.D.2d 353, 627 N.Y.S.2d 707 (2d Dep't 1995).
" The trial court sustained the plaintiffs motion to strike the physician's af-
firmative defenses, which asserted that, since no physician/patient relationship ex-
isted between the wife and the defendant, no cause of action was stated by the
wife. Defendant cross moved at trial to dismiss the wife's cause of action, and the
trial court denied the motion. The second department reversed the trial court's
ruling, holding that since no physician patient relationship existed between the
wife and her husband's doctor, the doctor therefore had no affirmative duty to
warn her of her husband's infectious disease and the risk that she might contract
it, and that the doctor had no statutory duty to so warn her.
11 In its analysis, the Ellis court cited Palka for the proposition that "[ilt is
well settled that before a defendant may be held liable for negligence, it must be
shown that the defendant breached a duty of reasonable care to the plaintiff."
Ellis, 211 A.D.2d at 355, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 709. The appellate court reasoned that
sustaining the lower court's ruling extending the duty of care to the patient's wife
would lead it down a very slippery slope whereupon it "perceive[d] no demarcation
of the point where that duty would end." Id. And thus, it may become financially
burdensome for medical care providers and insurance companies.
"s Liability on this fact pattern exists in a number of states, and financial ruin
for insurance companies has not occurred, nor is it even a remote threat. See
supra note 75, and infra note 119 and accompanying text.
... This is Judge Kaye's expression. See supra note 22.
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there was no duty on the part of the physician to warn the
nonpatient spouse.
The court noted that under facts similar to those before it
in Ellis, "many foreign jurisdictions would accord the wife a
cause of action in common law negligence against the defen-
dant."' However, "the common law of New York State does
not impose such a duty" and the court declined to adopt the
positions taken in the foreign cases cited in its decision."
In rejecting the Second Restatement Torts § 324A stan-
dard for analyzing the issue, as well as the foreign precedent
presented to it in support of plaintiff's position, the court's 3-1
majority opinion relied on Madden v. Creative Services,' a
case involving violation of attorney client privilege.' In
Madden, the Court of Appeals held that New York did not
recognize such a claim in tort, though criminal sanctions would
still apply. 4 Relying on precedents with such disparate facts
is an improper way to protect certain interests from imprudent
risk management schemes and assessments.The Ellis court continued to express fear of finding that a
duty was owed by the physician to the patient's wife, quoting
Madden and explaining that:
[t]ort liability depends on balancing competing interests: "the ques-
tion remains who is legally bound to protect [a plaintiffs rights] at
' Ellis, 211 A.D.2d at 356, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (citing Bradshaw v. Daniel,
854 S.W.2d 865 (Tenn. 1993); DiMarco v. Lynch Homes-Chester County Inc., 559
A.2d 530 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), affd, 583 A.2d. 422 (Pa. 1990); Shepard v. Redford
Community Hosp., 390 N.W.2d 239 (Mich. 1986); Bradley Center, Inc. v. Weasner,
287 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1982); McIntosh v. Milano, 403 A.2d 500 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1979)).
Ellis, 211 A.D.2d at 356-57, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 710-71L The court also declined
to adopt the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A position.
84 N.Y.2d 738, 646 N.E.2d 780, 622 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1995).
Specifically, plaintiff sued for breach of attorney client privilege based upon
a break in to attorney's offices and subsequent copying of his files. The que3tion of
whether an intruder's violation of such a privilege gave rise to a tort action was
certified to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Madden v.
Creative Services, Inc., 24 F.3d 394 (1994).
1" Madden v. Creative Services, Inc., 84 N.Y.2d 738, 746, 646 N.E.2d 780, 784,
622 N.Y.S.2d 478, 482 (1995). Chief Judge Kaye stated 'a new cause of action will
have foreseeable and unforeseeable consequences, most especially the potential for
vast, uncircumscribed liability." See also supra comment at note 95. Judge Kaye's
pronouncement seems to express a fear of returning to the pre-Palsgraf days of
analysis in light of foreseeable consequences rather than foreseeable plaintiff. See
supra notes 30, 32, and 35 and accompanying text.
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the risk of liability... [To identify an interest in deserving protec-
tion does not suffice to collect damages from anyone who causes
injury to that interest" .... Not every deplorable act... is r-
edressable in damages."
The notion that not every act that causes injury is redressable
in damages is quite reasonable. However, precedent notes that
even nonfeasance may rise to the level of an "affirmative
act,"2 ' and thus would be redressable in damages. Similarly,
the notion that an act is deplorable implies two things: (1) that
an act was taken, so there is no question of misfeasance, or
nonfeasance; and (2) that such act was egregious and by defini-
tion worthy of reproach or blame. Using the court's own rea-
soning that some instances of nonfeasance rise to the level of
an affirmative act, a case may be made that deplorable acts
also rise to a level at which they are redressable in damag-
es.12
7
The Ellis court's majority opinion is, to date, the best ex-
pression of the outrageous condition created by the economic
fear of finding liability in a case where an injury results from
nonfeasance. Indeed, it approaches the magnum opus fear of
liability expressed by the Strauss court's majority.121
1 Ellis, 211 A.D.2d at 357, 627 N.Y.S.2d at 710 (quoting Madden, 84 N.Y.2d
at 746, 646 N.E.2d at 784, 622 N.Y.S.2d at 482).
16 See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
" To extricate itself from this problem of precedent, the majority then declare
that, since the "defendant owed no cognizable duty to the wife .... he could not
be held liable for the wife's condition, regardless of whether his alleged malprac-
tice may be perceived as negligently impacting upon her." Again, no privity, no
duty, no recovery.
1" In a recent holding consistent with Ellis, Torres v. Colin Office Serv. Inc.,
231 A.D.2d 510, 647 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1996), the second department reversed
on the law the trial court's denial of summary judgment to defendant contractor,
holding that a janitorial service that contracted to maintain certain premises,
which maintenance included cleaning the floors, was not liable to a person who
worked in that building who slipped and fell on a puddle resulting from heavy
rain and a leak in the ceiling of the building.
The Torres court reasoned that
the defendant had only limited contractual duties to clean the floor on
which [plaintiffi fell. The contract did not specifically state that the de-
fendant was obligated to mop up water accumulation as a result of a
longstanding leak in the ceiling ... [and allthough defendant had
cleaned away accumulated water on many occasions, it only did so after
it was directed to take such action.
Id. This is a very generous reading of circumstances so as to create what seems
to be, though the court does not label it thus, nonfeasance. The Torres court fur-
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In another recent appellate division case, Torres v. Colin
Office Services, Inc.,' the second department cites Eaves
Brooks for the proposition that where defendant had no affir-
mative obligation to prevent a condition, and had no actual
notice of, nor any order to remedy the dangerous condition,
there is no contractor liability. In so holding, the Torres court
ignored the more recent rule in Palka, and thus offered a
prime example of how the confused state of New York law
today may leave an injured party without an adequate reme-
dy.13
0
ther held that the repair of the ceiling was the responsibility of the buildingrs
managing agent, and that the leak and resulting puddle were longstanding condi-
tions that defendant knew of, but had no duty to prevent or remedy. It is clear
from the court's opinion that the managing agent had a duty to repair the leak,
and that the contractor had cleaned the floor on numerous occasions prior to the
one prompting this action, but the plaintiff had no sustainable cause of action.
This is a prime example of the 'Peter" principle that 'every deplorable act is not
redressable in damages." See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
231 A.D.2d 510, 647 N.Y.S.2d 232 (2d Dep't 1996).
It may be argued by some that the terms of the contract in Pa/ha make
that case distinguishable from Torres. Specifically, Servicemaster was being paid a
very large sum of money to perform its duties. However, according to the opinion
of the court, there was always a question as to whether the fan was within the
scope of Servicemaster's contract. What the Paka court did find was that Nurse
Palka and all others who entered the hospital were entitled to a hold a reasonable
expectation that somebody was responsible for maintaining that fan. This, of
course, has nothing to do with the amount of money Servicemaster was paid by
Ellis Hospital, and by the same token, Mr. Torres could have been entitled to hold
a reasonable expectation that somebody was responsible for mopping up the water
from the floor. While the court held that the building's managing agent was re-
sponsible for the repair of the ceiling, it also wrote that the cleaning contractor
had mopped the water from the floor on numerous occasions. It would not illogical
to assume that Mr. Torres relied on that history.
While the second department does not recognize a ontractor's liability in tort
under the Torres facts, in Flynn v. Niagara University, 198 A.f.2d 262, 603
N.Y.S.2d 874 (1993), the same court recognized that liability would obtain where a
contractor had assumed a duty toward a third party by taking an affirmative
action and then negligently performing. However, in Guarcllo v. Rouse Si Shop-
ping Center, Inc., 204 A.D.2d 685, 612 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1994), a case decided a few
months after Flynn, the same court held that where a tenant in a shopping mall
hired a security company such tenant did not assume "any duty of care to prevent
foreseeable harm to [a] child who was allegedly assaulted" by others loitering in
the mall outside the particular tenant's premises, though the court did hold that
the tenant may have owed obligations to the landlord, and other issues of material
fact existed precluding summary judgment for the landlord, specifically, what duty
the landlord owed to protect the plaintiff from acts of third parties. Id. at 685,
612 N.Y.S.2d at 239.
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The Court of Appeals opinion in Milliken & Co. v. Con-
solidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.1 ' cites a line of
cases including Eaves Brooks as a way of discussing the prop-
osition from Strauss, reiterated in Eaves Brooks, that "deter-
mining the scope of the duty and the consequent sphere of
potential liability is fundamentally a policy question, with the
objective being to Tix[ ] the [entity's] orbit of duty' so as to
'mit the legal consequences of wrongs to a controllable de-
gree.' "1"2 This, essentially, states that if a finding of liability
will cost too much money, or will in some way have the poten-
tial to ruin an entity that is vital to public interests, such as a
public utility or a municipal corporation, the scope of duty will
be carefully circumscribed.
The Milliken court acknowledged, but attempted to distin-
guish, the Palka rule. The unanimous decision of the court
makes clear its policy: "Applying our benchmarks [as outlined
in Palka"1, we have as a general policy and approach de-
clined to leapfrog duties, over directly judicially related parties,
to noncontractually related [parties]."" The court is quite
candid about its reasons for this holding. Reaching back to
Strauss v. Belle Realty Co., 5' the court explains that it need-
ed to "contain liability to manageable levels,"36 i.e., not allow
costs to run too high. This was accomplished in Strauss by
containing plaintiffs to a more than nebulous "narrowly de-
fined class."" 7
C. The Restatement Solution
The Second Restatement of Torts, in sound, linear logic,
indicates that the threshold question of whether a duty is owed
to a third party must first be answered before examining the
131 84 N.Y.2d 469, 644 N.E.2d 686, 619 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1994).
Id. at 477, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 688 (citations omitted).
13 That is, that "the existence and scope of an alleged tortfeasor's duty ... is
[usually) a legal, policy-laden determination dependent on consideration of different
forces, including logic, science, competing socioeconomic policies, and contractual
assumptions of responsibility." Milliken, 84 N.Y.2d at 477, 644 N.E.2d 686,
N.Y.S.2d at 689.
23 Milliken, 84 N.Y.2d at 477, 644 N.E.2d at 690, 619 N.Y.S.2d at 689.
13 65 N.Y.2d 399, 482 N.E.2d 34, 492 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1985).
13 Id. at 404, 482 N.E.2d at 37, 492 N.Y.S. at 558.
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question of breach of that duty. Keeping in mind that this
seems to ignore Professor Prosser's warning that this approach
begs the essential question,' indeed, it turns this question
on its head, a competent analysis must begin where the state
of the law is, not where it ought to be. In New York, when an
injury is sustained by a third party not in privity with a con-
tractor, the question of duty owed is currently framed by the
court's holding in Palka as a pure question of law for the
courts to determine. 9 Unfortunately for injured plaintiffs, it
may well be logically impossible to define a duty as existing
under those terms, as, Palka notwithstanding, where there is
no privity of contract, New York law still seems to stand for
the proposition that no liability can attach between the con-
tractor and the party not in privity. If this is so, a person who
is injured at the hands of a contractor who has not undertaken
a duty toward that person is left with a very real injury, but
no remedy in either contract or tort, because there is no legal
duty owed to that person. In such cases the contract definition
of duty defines the tort liability as nonexistent.
The current New York common law duty analysis for the
purposes of holding a contractor liable in tort to a party not in
privity begins and ends with the questions of privity and
whether misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance has oc-
curred. If a party is in privity, it may be held that a duty is
owed and liability attaches if the type of negligence alleged is
misfeasance or malfeasance. However, liability will not attach
where the alleged negligence arises as nonfeasance. If a party
is not in privity, there is by definition no duty owed in con-
tract, and prior to Palka, there was no way to find liability in
tort.
CONCLUSION
Palka has given New York courts the chance to seize upon
precedent and formulate an equitable rule for contractor liabil-
ity in tort to third parties not in privity of contract. Yet New
See supra note 60.
Palka, 83 N.Y.2d 579, 634 N.E.2d 189, 611 N.Y.S.2d 817 ("unlike foresee-
ability, and causation... [duty is] usually a legal, policy4adea declaration re-
served for Judges to make prior to submitting anything to fact-finding or jury
consideration.")
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
York jurisprudence purports to have long since done away with
the need for privity to hold a contractor liable in tort, and
while the language in Palka hints at that, no clear test has
been posited for holding a contractor liable in tort to parties
not in privity.
As convoluted as it is in some places, the Palka language
is ripe for use in formulating a test for contractor liability in
tort that is close to a quasi-contract test. This "quasi-tort" test
may be explained as follows: (1) where a contractor owes a
duty in contract to a party in privity, that duty will extend to a
party not in privity if such party is injured by the negligence of
the contractor in either perforniing or not performing a con-
tracted for task; (2) if a contractor bargains to perform some
task, that contractor assumes a duty of reasonable care to all
comers; (3) if a person is injured due to reliance upon the con-
tractor's duty of care to the contracting party, the contractor
stands liable to the injured party notwithstanding a lack of
privity. If this test is reminiscent of a quasi-contract test, that
is because the quasi-contract analysis translates perfectly to
the problem at hand. If courts want to apply a contract analy-
sis to a situations involving tort liability, then let them apply
this equitable "quasi-tort" doctrine. Palka seems to tacitly
endorse this position, and that is where New York should
stand.
As a result of the continuation of an unnecessary distinc-
tion between misfeasance and nonfeasance, injured victims of
contractors are exposed to a potentially devastating paradox,
wherein a very real injury may not be compensable under cur-
rent law because the contractor neither owes them a duty in
contract or in tort. As it stands, for example, a busy building
owner who contracts a job to a skilled contractor may not be
liable to the plaintiff if said owner hired an expert to perform a
certain task and acted reasonably and responsibly in so doing.
Meanwhile, the contractor, even if negligent, retains the valid
argument that it owed no duty to the third person who is not
in privity, and therefore would not be held liable in tort unless
it committed an affirmative act to worsen existing conditions,
i.e., committed malfeasance or misfeasance, but not for simply
doing nothing to prevent an injury, i.e., nonfeasance.14
" In Palka v. Servicemaster Management Services Corp., 83 N.Y.2d 579, 587,
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The logic of this scenario leads to a disturbing result. Even
though the owner would have been liable in tort had it re-
tained control over the project and then performed poorly, prior
to 1990 a potential situation could have existed where a con-
tractor who was negligent owed no duty to an injured party
and the party that owed the duty was not, in fact, negligent.
Indeed, until 1990, there existed under New York common law
situations where there was a duty owed and there was negli-
gence, but potentially no defendant with legal responsibili-
ty. 41 New York now has the precedent to cure this problem.
All that remains necessary is for the legislature to codify the
rule or for the courts to adopt the equitable doctrine of quasi-
tort, and to consistently apply this most rational doctrine.
Andrew L. Weitz
634 N.E.2d 189, 193, 611 N.Y.S.2d 817, 821 (1994), the court pronounced that
[t]he nexus for a tort relationship between the defendantes contractual obligation
and the injured non-contracting plaintiffs reliance and ijury must be direct and
demonstrable, not incidental or merely collateral" (citations omitted).
" As of 1990, when Eaves Brooks was decided, New York held that such an
owner would not be held liable in tort for the negligence of the independent con-
tractor unless he expressly agreed to be so liable-and that was not lil-Ay to
occur.

